An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions by Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk & Lindroos, Marko
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Enforcement-Coalition Model: 
Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions 
 
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Marko Lindroos 
 
 
December 2003 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this WORKING PAPER may be used or repro-
duced in any manner whatsoever without the written permission of IME except 
in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. 
 
© University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg and the authors, 2003 
 
Editor: Eva Roth 
 
Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
IME WORKING PAPER 50/03 
 
ISSN 1399-3224 
 
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg 
Niels Bohrs Vej 9-10 
DK-6700 Esbjerg 
Tel.: +45 6550 4182 
Fax: +45 6550 1091 
E-mail: lg@sam.sdu.dk 
 
Marko Lindroos 
Department of Economics and Management 
P.O. Box 27 
University of Helsinki 
00014 Finland 
Tel: +358 9 191 58068 
Fax: +358 9 191 58096 
E-mail: marko.lindroos@helsinki.fi 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose 
of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities af-
fects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control 
effort yields less cooperation among fishermen, while in the case of low control 
effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how 
the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among au-
thorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. 
We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort com-
pared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by 
simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery. 
 
The authors acknowledge valuable comments and suggestions from Frank Jen-
sen and Niels Vestergaard. 
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1. Introduction 
It is a general problem that management measures in fisheries decided at the 
regional level often have to be implemented on the national level; hence, a cen-
trally determined policy is enforced on a decentralised level. This is termed by 
Holden (1994), the Achilles heal of the Common Fisheries Policy in EU. It is 
also known from earlier studies (e.g. Jensen 2001), that the enforcement of 
regulations at the national level may differ tremendously among countries, if 
there is any enforcement at all. The essence of the problem is that the individual 
states joining the agreement have no incentive to employ costs for monitoring 
and enforcement. The problem is also present in the Baltic Sea. The Interna-
tional Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) was established pursuant to the 
Gdansk Convention (IBSFC 2003). On signing this Convention, the Contract-
ing Parties undertook to 
"co-operate closely with a view to preserving and increasing the liv-
ing resources of the Baltic Sea and the Belts and obtaining the opti-
mum yield, and, in particular to expanding and co-ordinating studies 
towards these ends,..."1 
To comply with the Convention, the IBSFC introduced the first total allowable 
catch (TAC) on cod in the Baltic Sea in 1977. Until that time the fishery was 
subject to access based on bilateral agreement, where countries agreed to share 
territories in return for satisfying some technical conservation measures. In 
1977 the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) were also increased to 200 nautical 
miles, dividing the sea according to the centre line, which created some disputes 
over the islands of Bornholm and Gotland. In particular, the dispute between 
Sweden and the Soviet Union over Gotland Island gave rise to an area fre-
quently called the ‘White Zone’, in which there existed open access until 1987 
when Sweden and the Soviet Union finally came to an agreement. Comparing 
the TAC with actual harvests indicates that the TAC has often been exceeded, 
see table I. 
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1 Source: Article 1 of the Gdansk Convention, IBSFC (2003), www.ibsfc.org. 
Table I. TAC for Cod in the Baltic Sea and the actual Catches 
Year TAC Catch Excess Catch Excess catch
 Tonnes Tonnes Tonnes % of TAC 
1977 185 211.1 26.1 14.11%
1978 174 194.6 20.6 11.85%
1979 175 272.7 97.7 55.85%
1980 235 389.6 154.6 65.78%
1981 227 384.4 157.4 69.33%
1982 No TAC 363.6     
1983 No TAC 380.8     
1984 No TAC 441.4     
1985 No TAC 355.2     
1986 No TAC 279.3     
1987 No TAC 235.6     
1988 No TAC 223.9     
1989 220 197.7 -22.3 -10.14%
1990 211 171.3 -39.7 -18.80%
1991 171 139.2 -31.8 -18.59%
1992 100 72.9 -27.1 -27.12%
1993 40 66.4 26.4 66.03%
1994 60 124.0 64.0 106.75%
1995 120 141.6 21.6 18.01%
1996 165 172.7 7.7 4.69%
1997 180 132.2 -47.8 -26.54%
1998 145 101.5 -43.5 -29.97%
Source: ACFM (2000) and own calculations. 
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Neither before the establishment of the IBSFC, nor after has there been any ef-
fective enforcement and the fishery is considered to be de facto open access. 
Furthermore, it is pointed out in Kronbak (2002) that the cod fishery, from 
1982-1999, seems to fit a dynamic open access model rather well. This, again, 
is an example of the general enforcement problem. Coalitions among fishermen 
do exist in some real world settings, for instance in the form of producer or-
ganizations (POs).2 Producer organisations are, however, not very common in 
the Baltic Sea, particularly not in the Eastern European countries. This paper 
sets up a model to discuss the effects of fishermen forming a coalition and the 
effect of having a decentralised versus a centralised enforcement policy. The 
model is inspired by the actual situation in the Baltic Sea, but it is a general 
model with relevance to all regulated fisheries where management measures are 
decided centrally but implemented on the decentralised level. 
 
In the existing literature there are models where part of the control is at the cen-
tralised level and part is at the decentralised level (Caplan & Silva 1999). Our 
model contributes to the literature by modelling coalitions on the enforcement 
level taking into account coalitions at the regulated level. In addition, it opens 
up for discussing the question of how centralised, decentralised or partly cen-
tralised enforcement can affect the way fishermen form coalitions. 
 
Previous fisheries enforcement studies include Sutinen & Andersen (1985) who 
examined the enforcement of fish quotas in a single-player model, Jensen & 
Lindroos (2002) who studied enforcement of fish quotas in a two-player model 
and Jensen & Vestergaard (2002a) who investigated the moral hazard problem 
when individual catches are unobservable to society. These studies have not 
considered the possibility of forming coalitions. There exist studies that have 
addressed coalition formation, mainly on the international level, such as Lin-
droos (2002), Duarte et al. (2000) and Pintassilgo (2003). However, these stud-
ies do not consider the enforcement problem. The present study integrates these 
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2 In Denmark there are 3 POs; the Danish Fishermen’s Producer Organisation, Denmark’s Pe-
lagic Producer Organisation, and Skagen Fishermen’s Producer’s Organisation. 
two types of models by introducing coalition formation to both the authorities 
(international) and the fishermen. 
 
The purpose of the paper is to show the effects of fishermen forming coalitions 
and authorities forming coalitions given the authority undertakes a certain level 
of quota enforcement. The paper discusses the effects of authorities being cen-
tralised, partly centralised or decentralised. The paper sets up a four stage static 
model. The four stages of the model are illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The four stages of the model 
Stage 1 
Authorities choose coalition structure: 
Centralised, Partly Centralised, Decentralised 
Stage 2 
Authorities choose control effort level. (Choose Z) 
Stage 3 
Fishermen choose coalition structure: 
Grand Coalition, Two-player coalition and a singleton, 
3 Singletons 
Stage 4 
Fishermen choose optimal effort level. (Choose e) 
 
 
The first two stages of the model belong to the authorities. In stage one; the au-
thorities decide their level of coalition formation. There are three defined levels 
of centralisation among authorities; centralised (a grand coalition among au-
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thorities), decentralised (no coalition among authorities) or partly centralised (a 
two-player coalition and a singleton). Given the level of centralisation decided 
by authorities, they then decide their level of enforcement in stage two. The last 
two stages belong to the three groups of fishermen. They also start out by de-
ciding which coalition to belong to in stage three. The fishermen also have three 
possible coalition structures, namely, three singletons playing Nash against 
each other, a two-player coalition and a singleton or a grand coalition. In stage 
four they maximise the expected profits by deciding the employed effort level. 
As with the authorities, the fishermen also have the choice of joining three dif-
ferent coalition formations. This yields nine different scenarios to analyse.3 
These nine scenarios are illustrated in figure 2. 
 
                                                          
 
11 
3 We ignore that there are three possible two-player coalitions among authorities since we later 
assume that the authorities are identical. We also ignore that there are three possible two-player 
coalitions among fishermen, in this case we simply choose the most efficient coalition. 
Figure 2. Illustration of nine different scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non cooperative 
behaviour among 
groups of fishermen 
Two-player coalition 
among groups of 
fishermen 
Grand coalition 
among groups of 
fishermen 
Non cooperative 
behaviour among 
groups of fishermen 
Two-player coalition 
among groups of 
fishermen 
Grand coalition 
among groups of 
fishermen 
Single country 
authority decides 
control effort level 
Single country 
authority decides 
control effort level 
Single country 
authority decides 
control effort level 
Centralised authority 
decides  
control effort level 
Non cooperative 
behaviour among 
groups of fishermen 
Two-player coalition 
among groups of 
fishermen 
Grand coalition 
among groups of 
fishermen 
Single country 
authority decides 
control effort level 
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In our paper we analyse analytically six of the nine scenarios; those where au-
thorities are either completely centralised or completely decentralised, leaving 
the three scenarios in-between, where authorities are partly centralised for dis-
cussion only. 
 
At present, there are six contracting parties in the Baltic Sea: Estonia, the Euro-
pean Community, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Russian Federation. We 
can fit the six parties into our coalition model by grouping the contracting par-
ties into 3 authorities. These 3 authorities are represented by; the European 
Community, which is the largest agent, catching between 50-70% of the total 
catch of cod, Poland, which is the second largest agent, catching some 20-30% 
of the total catch of cod and the former Soviet Union (now Russia) and the 
three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) catching some 10-20% of 
the total catch of cod. We can also group the fishermen exploiting the cod stock 
into three groups represented by the technology they apply. The three main 
technologies for harvesting cod are demersal trawls, high opening trawls and 
gillnets, where gillnets catch up to 50% of the total catch, all three technologies 
are represented in each country group. Currently, there is no formalized coop-
eration among the authorities and there is only little cooperation among the 
fishermen in the Baltic Sea in the form of POs. This model seeks to explain the 
gains from cooperation on both the authorities and the fishermen levels. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. First a basic theoretical model is set up. The 
model is discussed theoretically for centralised and decentralised authorities. 
Then how enforcement can affect the way fishermen form coalitions is dis-
cussed. Simulations follow the theoretical model. Finally, the main results are 
discussed together with the scope for future research. 
2. The Basic Model 
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The model follows the basic two-stage structure used by Ruseski (1998) and 
Lindroos (2002). However, our model does differ, since we allow the players in 
each stage to make two decisions; first, which coalition to belong to and sec-
ond, which effort level to decide on. This explains the four stages of our one-
shot model. 
 
The Gordon-Schaefer model sets out the biological and production related char-
acteristics of the fishery considered in the paper. With three players, or groups 
of asymmetric fishermen, {1,2,3}, the dynamic equation looks as follows: 
 
( ) ∑
=
−=
3
1i
ihxGdt
dx , (1) 
 
where x is a single fish stock and hi is the harvest of the single group of fisher-
men. In this one shot model the discount rate is equal to zero for all groups of 
fishermen. It is assumed throughout that the fish stock is a common property of 
the fishermen and there are no potential new entrants. The natural growth of the 
fish stock is given by the logistic growth function: 
 
( ) 

 −=
K
xrxxG 1 , (2) 
 
where r is the intrinsic rate of growth of fish and K is the carrying capacity of 
the fishing ground. The harvest function for a group of fishermen following 
technology i is assumed to be linear, following the Gordon-Schaefer type: 
 
xeqh iii = , (3) 
 
where the term qi is the catchability coefficient for technology i, and ei is the 
effort employed by the group of fishermen applying technology i. We assume 
that the fishermen are asymmetric since they can differ in their catchability co-
efficients, qi’s. A higher catchability coefficient can be interpreted as a techno-
logical advantage. Without loss of generality we assume i is the most efficient 
technology and k is the least efficient technology, e.g. qi > qj > qk. 
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The steady state stock can be derived, using the equations (1) to (3), where har-
vesting equals growth: 
 


 −= ∑
=
3
1i
iieqrr
Kx , . (4) 0>x
 
Hence, for each level of fishing effort, given the catchability coefficients, there 
is a sustainable steady state stock level. 
 
The authorities are able to act as Stackelberg leaders against the groups of fish-
ermen. Therefore, the problem is solved backwards. In the fourth stage, fisher-
men choose the effort that maximises the individual expected steady-state rents 
given their choosen coalition structure and the enforcement level. The individ-
ual group of fishermen further takes the effort level by rival group(s) as given. 
The fishermen, or coalitions, are playing a Nash game against each other. In the 
third stage the fishermen decide coalition formation. In the second stage, each 
authority unilaterally chooses the level of control effort in its region, taking into 
account full knowledge of how control effort influences the third and fourth 
stage equilibrium and taking the foreign control effort level as given, in the case 
of decentralised control authorities. In the first stage the authorities decide 
which coalition structure to belong too. Each authority plays a Stackelberg 
game in the effort level against the fishermen and a Nash game in control effort 
policies against the foreign authority. The authorities’ problem is to set a level 
of enforcement, given that control is costly. This type of authority problem is 
discussed in Jensen and Lindroos (2002). We contribute to the literature by al-
lowing for asymmetry among fishermen and also by allowing fishermen to 
form coalitions. This is relevant for the society since coalitions on both levels 
might result in more compliance with TACs even though less effort is em-
ployed for control. 
 
The fishery is managed by a total allowable catch (TAC) and it is assumed that 
the TAC is set at a sufficiently low level, restricting the effort of the fishermen. 
Since control is costly it is not optimal for the authorities to choose perfect con-
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trol. The authorities are assumed to maximise the economic surplus given by 
the difference between fishermen’s profits and the control costs. Only fisher-
men having homeport in own country group are considered. The decision vari-
able for the authorities is the level of control effort, Z. The maximisation prob-
lem for a single authority is as follows: 
 
( )
10..
1
3
1
<≤
−−Ψ=∑=
Zts
Z
PMax
i
iZ
γπ , (5) 
 
where Pi(Ψ) describes the fishermen’s profit facing probability Ψ of being de-
tected applying technology i. γ is the unit cost of control effort. The second term 
on the RHS describes the total costs of control; we see that if the control effort 
is extensive, Z approaches one, then the costs of control go to infinity. On the 
other hand, if control effort approaches zero, there are still some fixed man-
agement costs. 
 
The fishermen choose their level of fishing effort based on expected profit 
maximisation according to the following formula: 
 
( ) ( )( )( )


≤−
>ΨΩ−−Ψ−
=
iiiie
iiiie
ie TAChcephMax
TAChcephMax
PEMax
i
i
i
1
. (6) 
 
Assuming the TAC is set at a sufficiently low level then there is non-
compliance.4 The profit when not complying with the TAC is determined by the 
ordinary profit minus an expected lump-sum fine (ΨΩ) and an expected penalty 
depending on the value of the harvest (Ψphi). Ψ is the probability of being 
caught. We assume there is a one-to-one linear relationship between the control 
effort and the probability of being caught, hence Z=Ψ. 
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4 Non-compliance is, of course, only true for some levels of control effort, but either by assum-
ing an extremely low TAC or by assuming fishermen face some high fixed costs, we can 
‘force’ the fishermen to non-compliance. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; First, we analyse the three 
scenarios resulting from the authorities agreeing on being completely central-
ised, second we analyse the three scenarios resulting from the authorities being 
completely decentralised. Third, we discuss what happens if the authorities are 
partly centralised. Finally, we discuss the stability of the coalition structures 
and illustrate some of the results using a simulation model. 
3. A Centralised Authority 
This section analyses the three scenarios resulting from the control authorities 
forming a grand coalition and acting as a single centralised authority. The fish-
ermen can join three different coalitions; act as three singletons playing Nash 
against each other, a two-player coalition playing Nash against a singleton or a 
grand coalition. The fishermen maximise their profits after deciding which coa-
lition structure to belong to. The fishermen’s behaviour and the optimal control 
effort in three different coalition structures are evaluated. 
3.1. Three Singletons among Fishermen 
The non-cooperative equilibrium is determined where the groups of fishermen 
act as singletons playing Nash against each other. Since the control authority 
acts as a Stackelberg leader, the problem is solved by backwards induction. In-
serting the steady state stock (equation (4)) and the harvest function (equation 
(3)) into the profit function for the fishermen (equation (6)) and maximising the 
expected profit for the groups of fishermen yields the following reaction func-
tions for group i: 
 
i
kkjj
i
i q
eqeq
q
br
e
2
1 −−


 −
=  ,i∀ kji ≠≠ , (7) 
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where ( ) 01 >Ψ−= pK
cb .The Nash equilibrium effort is derived by the intersec-
tions of the reaction functions for the groups of fishermen, which yields the best 
response for all fishermen given others best response. The optimal effort em-
ployed by a single group of fishermen where fishermen are playing a Nash 
game follows the following formula: 
 
i
kjiN
i q
r
q
b
q
b
q
b
e
4
31 


 ++−
=  , i . (8) i∀ kj ≠≠
 
It must be assumed that 13 <++−
kji q
b
q
b
q
b , to ensure that effort employed is posi-
tive. The Nash equilibrium effort depends on the risk of being caught, Ψ, since 
it is a part of b. If the risk of being caught increases, that is if b increases, then 
the Nash effort level decreases if it is assumed that 
kji qqq
11
3
1 +>  for all 
. Since the resource is a shared stock among the three groups of 
fishermen, the effort employed by one group of fishermen has a negative effect 
on the level of effort employed by others. If, for instance, fishermen with tech-
nology i become more effective, that is the catchability coefficient, q
kjikji ≠≠,,,
i, in-
creases, then the effort of fishermen with technology j and k decreases. The 
change in the effort for fishermen applying technology i is, however, ambigu-
ous. On the one hand there is an increase in the effort resulting from being more 
efficient, but on the other hand with a higher catchability, less effort is required 
to retain the same harvest level. 
 
Solving backwards now allows us to solve the problem of the centralised au-
thorities. The benefit function for the authorities is defined by (5), where the 
fishermen’s profit function (6), the steady state stock (4) and the harvest func-
tion (3) are inserted. The authorities maximise their benefit function of harvest-
ing minus the control costs written as follows: 
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∑ ∑
=
=
−−










−










−=
3
1
3
1
0 1i
i
j
jj
iiZ Z
ce
r
eqK
KepqMax γπ . (9) 
 s.t. 10 <≤ Z  
 
Penalties paid by fishermen from exceeding the TAC are exactly offset by the 
income received by the authority.5 
 
Inserting the optimal effort level employed by fishermen (7) and determining 
the first order condition for the centralised authority (CA) when fishermen are 
playing Nash (N) yields the optimal enforcement level, given that enforcement 
is costly: 
 
γ2222222
2
821118
1
KpqKpqrcrc
qqq
qrc
rcZ
kji
N
CA
−++


 ++
−= , (10) 
 
where 
kji qqqq
1111 ++= . It is observed, that a higher level of control costs de-
creases the optimal control effort. The intuition behind this is that more expen-
sive enforcement is less appropriate to apply (Becker 1968). Hence, if enforce-
ment control is extremely expensive, it might imply less effort employed and 
thus more non-compliance. If compliance is the goal in such a case, it might be 
wise to consider subsidising the control policy. The effects of changes in other 
parameters are included in comparative statics later. 
3.2. Coalitions among Fishermen 
This section discusses the implications of fishermen forming either a two-player 
coalition or a grand coalition. 
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5 We assume no double dividend exits; that is, tax revenues cannot be used to reduce other dis-
torting taxes Jensen & Vestergaard (2002b). 
Assume two groups of fishermen form a two-player coalition we assume i and k 
form a coalition, {i,k}. The two-player coalition plays a Nash game against the 
singleton. The coalition is assumed to apply the most efficient technology in the 
coalition, since the marginal benefits from applying the most efficient technol-
ogy are always higher than the marginal benefits from applying a less efficient 
technology.6,7 It is intuitively clear, that fishermen with the highest efficiency 
have to employ the lowest level of effort to reach a certain level of harvest. This 
implies that the benefits are highest from forming a coalition of heterogeneous 
fishermen compared to a coalition of homogeneous fishermen. Thus POs are 
most suitable across heterogeneous technologies. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to deal with the question of how the benefits are distributed among the 
groups in a coalition. 
 
The grand coalition is defined as full cooperation among all groups of fisher-
men. The grand coalition is also assumed to apply the most efficient technology 
in the coalition. 
 
The optimal fishing effort and the optimal level of control effort when fisher-
men form coalitions are summarised in the appendix, table A.I and table A.II. 
 
From the optimal level of control effort we can conclude, that in the scenario 
with a grand coalition among fishermen, self-regulation works and there is no 
need for government intervention. This conclusion is drawn from the fact, that 
only a corner solution, where Z = 0, satisfies 0 ≤ Z < 1.8 The intuition behind 
this result is that fishermen forming a grand coalition maximise an objective 
function comparable to the objective function of the society except for the costs 
                                                          
6 We are analysing only the two-player coalition among i and k. This coalition is the most effi-
cient coalition (together with the coalition between j and k) since the technology of the least ef-
ficient group of fishermen (k) is ‘hidden’ in a coalition and therefore not applied. 
7 The reason that we do not have a reallocation of effort in the coalition but a corner solution, 
where the effort employed by the least efficient technology is zero, is that we assume marginal 
costs are constant. 
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8 We consider that the cases of having a zero biological growth rate (r=0) or zero harvesting 
costs (c=0) are too unrealistic. 
of control. Thus, if the society observes that the fishermen are organising in one 
large PO, then the circumstances permit the control effort to be reduced to zero. 
Since we are not able to make further analytical conclusions, we use compara-
tive statics on the level of control effort. 
3.3. Comparative Statics on the Level of Control Effort 
The effects of changes in economic parameters are determined by comparative 
statics analysis on the level of control effort in the case of fishermen playing 
Nash and in the two-player coalition.9 The effects of changes in price and costs 
are summarised in table II and the effects of changes in the catchability measure 
are summarised in table III. 
 
Table II. Comparative statics on optimal control effort w.r.t. price and cost 
parameters 
 γ c p 
N
CAZ  - - if 
( )kjkiji kji qqqqqqr
qqq
c ++>
γ16
+ if 
( )kjkiji kji qqqqqqr
qqq
c ++>
γ8  
C
CAZ
2  - - if 
( )ji ji qqr
qq
c +>
γ18  
+ if 
( )ji ji qqr
qq
c +>
γ9  
Note: - indicates a negative effect, + indicates a positive effect. 
 
From table II we can conclude that the optimal level of control effort unambi-
guously decreases, if the costs of control increase. The result is, however, am-
biguous when analysing the effect of changes in prices and costs of harvesting. 
The ambiguity is a result of control effort being dependent on prices and costs 
in an advanced fashion. The authorities should, therefore, not react to changes 
in prices and costs, unless they have accurate information about estimated pa-
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9 Comparative statics in the scenario of a grand coalition among fishermen are omitted since it is 
a corner solution. Only zero costs of harvesting can make the corner solution move from the no 
control to the full control effort level. This is, however, not a realistic scenario. 
rameter values, but instead accept a second best solution. If the unit cost of har-
vesting is sufficiently high, we can conclude that the optimal control effort in-
creases if p is increased and decreases if harvesting costs are increased. 
 
Table III. Comparative statics on optimal control effort w.r.t. catchability 
parameters 
 qi 
N
CAZ  + if ( )( ) ( ) γ22222 1616 1616 kjkjkjkj kjkjkji qKpqqqqcrKpqqqrc
qKpqcqcqqcrq
q −+++
−+>  for i { } kjikj ≠≠= ,3,2,1,,
{ }ki
CAZ
,  + if ( )
γ22 1818
18
jj
jj
i KpqcrKpqrc
Kpqccrq
q −+
−>  for { } kjikji ≠≠= ,3,2,1,,   
Note: + indicates a positive effect. 
 
From table III we can conclude that if the catchability coefficient in question is 
sufficiently high, then a further increase in the catchability coefficient implies 
an increase in the control effort level. This is true for the control effort level in 
both the Nash game among fishermen and the two-player coalition among fish-
ermen. The intuition behind this is that one player, who is already efficient, be-
comes even more efficient and it is thus easier to not comply. An increase in 
control effort has the opposite effect. In the two-player coalition case there is an 
effect of an increase in qk only when qk exceeds qi, otherwise the effect is zero. 
If the catchability for group k is increased such that qk>qi, then group k be-
comes the most efficient in the coalition, and a switch between technology k 
and i will take place. 
4. A Decentralised Authority 
Consider the authorities to be completely decentralised; e.g. there are three in-
dividual authorities each setting their own level of control effort based on a 
Nash game against other authorities and a Stackelberg game against the fisher-
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men. The control effort in one country only affects fishermen from this country. 
In each country there are fishermen representing all three different technologies. 
Therefore, control effort levels set by all three authorities affect each group of 
fishermen. To simplify, it is assumed that the groups of fishermen consist of 
one-third from each country; hence the control policy from the countries has 
equal weight on each group of fishermen.10 This assumption implies that we can 
maximise the profit of the groups of fishermen only considering the level of 
control effort corresponding to the sum of Z’s applied in the three countries. We 
also assume that countries are symmetric, e.g. the lump-sum penalty for being 
caught is the same in all three countries and so are the unit costs of control.11 
We determine the optimal effort employed by fishermen and the optimal con-
trol effort by the authorities in the three scenarios resulting from fishermen 
forming coalitions. 
4.1. Three Singletons among Fishermen 
Denote the three authorities by 1, 2 and 3. The benefits for the fishermen apply-
ing technology i are now determined by the following formula: 
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Equation (11) is an extension of equation (5). It describes the fishermen’s profit 
from applying technology i, but since this technology is represented in all three 
countries with 1/3 in each of them, then 1/3 of them face control effort Z1, 1/3 
                                                          
10 This assumption does not change the general result since the control effort will always be inter-
preted by the fishermen as the sum of control efforts. If the shares of different technologies 
change, it only changes the weight the different levels of control effort have in the sum of con-
trol efforts. 
11 Without symmetry among authorities the analysis becomes complicated, and it might not be 
possible to achieve an analytical solution. 
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face control effort Z2 and 1/3 face control effort Z3. The optimal effort em-
ployed in the fishery is determined and summarised in the appendix, table A.III. 
 
The optimal effort employed by fishermen when the authorities are decentral-
ised is equivalent to the effort level employed in the centralised authority sce-
nario, except that the optimal control effort is now considered as an average 
control effort. Since the fishermen consider the control effort only as a single 
level, the way the authorities can affect the coalition structure is unchanged 
compared to the case with a centralised authority. What differs is, however, 
how to reach a certain level of control effort when the authorities play a Nash 
game against each other. 
 
The three authorities each maximise their net present values of harvest minus 
the costs of control according to the following formula: 
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Since the optimal effort employed in the fishery depends on the optimal control 
effort set by other authorities there is an externality in the control effort. The 
externality in control effort arises from the fact that, if one country increases its 
control effort, then it affects the optimal fishing effort and hereby influences the 
control effort level chosen by another country. 
 
Assuming the authorities play Nash against each other we can solve for optimal 
Z in each country (the results are summarized in the appendix, table A.IV). We 
observe that the level of control effort for the centralised authorities resembles 
the level of optimal control effort in the case of centralised authorities (see table 
A.IV). The only difference is the negative factor in front of the control costs, γ, 
in the denominator. In the centralised case the factor is -8, in the decentralised 
case the factor is three times smaller, namely -24. A main explanation for this 
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difference can be found in the fact that the decentralised authorities face three 
times the fixed costs faced by the centralised authorities. We can conclude that 
when fishermen are playing a Nash game against each other and other things 
are equal, then the single authority in the decentralised scenario has an optimal 
level of control effort that is lower than the optimal level of control for the cen-
tralised authority. The level of control effort is, however, identical for the cen-
tralised authorities and the single decentralised authority if the costs of control, 
γ, are zero. An increase in the costs of control implies that the gap between the 
control efforts in the two scenarios increases. Since we have assumed identical 
countries, the average control effort in the decentralised scenario is equivalent 
to the control effort set by a single authority in the decentralised case. There-
fore, the fishermen face a lower level of control effort when the authorities are 
decentralised compared to a centralised authority. The levels of control efforts 
are, however, equivalent if there are no control costs. The reason the control ef-
forts are lower in the decentralised scenario is that the control costs are consid-
ered to be an externality with high costs of control it is optimal for the single 
decentralised authority to choose a lower level of control effort since it plays 
Nash against other authorities. The authorities are free riding on each other. 
Holden (1994) and Jensen (2001) present some empirical studies of the EU em-
phasising that the control effort is lower when authorities are decentralised then 
when authorities are centralised. These studies and our analytical model suggest 
that, if society wants compliance, it might be easier to reach if authorities are 
centralised, given that this is a stable solution. 
4.2. Two-Player Coalition among Fishermen 
The optimal effort level employed in the fishery and the optimal control effort 
is determined when the fishermen form a two-player coalition playing Nash 
against the singleton. The optimal effort for group i is summarised in the ap-
pendix, table A.III. The optimal control effort in each country is found in the 
appendix, table A.IV. 
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When comparing the level of optimal control effort in the decentralised and the 
centralised scenarios (see table A.IV) the conclusion is exactly the same as in 
the case where fishermen play a Nash game. Namely, that the control effort 
only differs by the factor in front of the control effort costs. Hence, also in the 
two-player coalition among fishermen the level of control effort is also higher 
when authorities are centralised then when authorities are decentralised. 
4.3. Grand Coalition among Fishermen 
The optimal effort level for the grand coalition among fishermen and the corre-
sponding level of optimal control are determined and the results are summa-
rised in the appendix, tables A.III and A.IV. The optimal control effort is, 
again, a corner solution with Z=0. We can conclude that even if enforcement is 
decentralised, a grand coalition among fishermen is self-enforcing. 
5. A Two-Player Coalition Authority 
Authorities forming a two-player coalition playing Nash against a singleton 
complicates the analytics since the symmetry of the authorities disappears. The 
two-player coalition among authorities contains twice as many of fishermen as 
the singleton, but since the case is non-linear in Z, we cannot say anything 
about the relation between the optimal control effort for the coalition and the 
singleton. 
 
The fishermen forming coalitions are, however, not very different from the 
other scenarios. The fishermen still view the control effort as a single level and 
therefore the optimal effort employed for harvest in the three scenarios resem-
bles the scenarios where the authorities are centralised and decentralised. 
 
We are not able to solve these three scenarios analytically, but can conclude 
that the asymmetry implies results that are not directly comparable to the other 
six scenarios. Numerical simulations do, however, suggest that there is only a 
corner solution, where Z=0 for both rivals, satisfying the constraints when fish-
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ermen form a grand coalition. This seems likely since it underlines the results 
achieved when authorities are centralised or decentralised. 
 
To sum up; so far we have shown that the effort employed in the fishery is de-
pendent on the average control effort level, but is otherwise independent of the 
coalition formation among authorities. Furthermore, we have shown that the 
control effort level is higher when the authorities are decentralised compared to 
the control effort level set by centralised authorities, and this holds no matter 
which coalition formation the fishermen choose. 
6. Stability of Coalition Structures among Fishermen 
This section analyses the stability of the different coalition formations among 
fishermen. For a coalition to be stable there must be no group of fishermen with 
incentives to leave the coalition. To determine the benefits for the group of 
fishermen it is assumed that fishermen are rational and apply the optimal effort 
level given the control effort and the coalition structure. Since we assume the 
TAC is set at a sufficiently low level, the benefits for the single group or a coa-
lition of fishermen are determined by the following formula: 
 
( ) ( ) ΨΩ−−Ψ−=Ψ iiii cexepqP 1 . (13) 
 
The total benefits for the groups of fishermen are derived when fishermen are 
singletons, form a two-player coalition and form a grand coalition. The sum of 
benefits from free riding is also derived to determine when the grand coalition 
is stable. The total benefits when the fishermen act as three singletons are as 
follows: 
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The benefits in the case of a two-player coalition {i,k}12 are as follows: 
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The total benefits in the scenario of the grand coalition are as follows: 
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The sum of benefits from fishermen free riding is determined as follows: 
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The grand coalition is stable if and only if no group of fishermen has the incen-
tive to leave the coalition. As discussed in Pintassilgo (2003), the benefits from 
the grand coalition must exceed the sum of benefits from free riding, otherwise 
the cooperative benefits cannot be distributed in a way that satisfies each coun-
try. Furthermore, the benefits from the grand coalition must exceed the sum of 
benefits from a non-cooperative game. The two-player coalition is stable if the 
sum of benefits from this scenario exceeds the benefits from a Nash game, 
which are equivalent to the benefits from free riding. Since we are not able to 
conclude further from these equations, we illustrate the stability by a simula-
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12 There are two other possibilities for two-player coalitions, namely {i,j} and {j,k}. The former 
implies that j will have no harvesting activity and k will act as a singleton, the latter does not 
change our results since k will continue to have no harvesting activity. 
tion. The simulation model also discusses which solution is preferred by the au-
thorities. 
6.1.  Simulation 
A simulation model is set up to determine when the grand coalition among fish-
ermen is stable and whether the government is able to affect the fishermen’s 
coalition formation by its choice of control effort. It further determines which 
equilibrium coalition structure is preferred by the authorities. Parameter values 
inspired by the Baltic Sea cod fishery are applied. The costs of harvesting are 
determined as the average daily costs over the period 1995-1999 for a Danish 
vessel harvesting cod in the Baltic Sea. The price is determined as the average 
price per kilogram of cod over the same period. The cod stock is assumed to 
follow an intrinsic growth rate, r=0.4, which is an approximation for the growth 
rate from an OLS regression using data from 1966-1999. The OLS regression 
does, however, suggest an extremely high carrying capacity. This level of carry-
ing capacity is, in our view, unrealistically high, since the exploited stock has 
not, even in extremely good years, been a third of the estimated carrying capac-
ity. We therefore assume a more moderate carrying capacity level, and perform 
a sensitivity analysis w.r.t. the carrying capacity. The catchability coefficients 
are assumed to lie between 6 and 8, which are believed to be moderate values.13 
The parameter values are summarised in table IV. 
 
Table IV. Parameter values applied in the simulation model 
c K p qi qj qk r 
6492 230 8.07 8 6.5 6 0.4 
 
The benefits of the different coalition structures among fishermen are deter-
mined as functions of the control effort applied by the authorities and are plot-
ted in figure 3. The fishermen regard the level of control effort as an average 
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13 A sensitivity analysis w.r.t. the catchability coefficients, is possible but to save space we have 
omitted this. 
and do not change their behaviour according to the authorities’ coalition forma-
tion. 
 
Figure 3. Benefits from the grand coalition, sum of benefits from free rid-
ing, sum of benefits from three singletons 
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Hence, for 0 ≤ Z < 0.31 the grand coalition is stable. For 0.31 ≤ Z < 0.54 the 
scenario with the three singletons yields the highest profit, and for Z ≥ 0.54 the 
sum of free riding yields the highest profit. The scenario of all fishermen free 
riding is, however, not a possible solution. We, therefore, have to determine the 
profit of the three possible two-player scenarios to determine whether this profit 
exceeds the sum of profits for three singletons. The benefits from a two-player 
coalition are determined and plotted in figure 4 to determine when it is a stable 
scenario.14 
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14 We have only exploited the {i,k} coalition, but since k is the least efficient technology, highest 
payoff results if this technology is avoided by including it in a coalition. Coalition {i,k}and 
coalition {j,k} do, however, yield the same pay-offs since both scenarios result in a Nash game 
amongst i and j. 
Figure 4. Benefits from a two-player solution and benefits from a Nash 
game 
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From figure 4 we can conclude that the two-player coalition is stable only when 
the control effort level is sufficiently low (Z ≤ 0.24). This conclusion is drawn 
from the fact that, here, the benefits of the two-player coalition exceed the bene-
fits of the fishermen acting as three singletons playing a Nash game. The two-
player coalition is, however, not in the core since the grand coalition is also sta-
ble for these values of Z, and the grand coalition yields higher benefits. Com-
bining the results from figure 3 and figure 4 we can conclude that for 0 ≤ Z < 
0.31, the grand coalition is stable,15 for 0 ≤ Z ≤ 0.24 the two-player coalition is 
stable, but since the grand coalition yields higher payoffs, we assume that the 
fishermen choose this coalition formation. For large Z only the scenario with 
three singletons is stable. Thus, when control effort is low, it is optimal to form 
coalitions, hence coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. This means that a high 
level of control effort yields a Nash game among three singletons since the au-
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15 The grand coalition among fishermen is only socially optimal for zero control effort. 
thority does the job of controlling the fishermen. This result can be explained 
by the effect of free riding; the stock is harvested down since the punishment 
for exceeding the TAC is low, and a low stock implies a lower profit than can 
be achieved by cooperation. A higher control effort ensures a higher steady 
state stock level when thus making free riding more profitable and hence, more 
likely. This is some sort of self-regulation and might explain that cooperation is 
more likely when the control effort is low. Thus if society sets a low level of 
control effort, then one would expect more POs, which might explain why we 
see POs in real world settings. The uncertainty about carrying capacity empha-
sises that a discussion of the effects of changes in K is necessary. We have de-
termined how the stability of the coalition formation among fishermen changes 
if K is decreased by 25% or increased by 25%, 75% or 500%, respectively.16 
The results are summarized in table V. 
 
Table V. The effect of changes in K on the stability of the coalition forma-
tion among fishermen 
 Low 
values of Z 
Low-Mid 
values of Z 
Mid-High 
values of Z 
High 
values of Z 
25% decrease 
 
grand coalition 3 singletons 3 singletons 
Original K 
 
grand coalition 3 singletons 3 singletons 
25% increase 
 
2-player coalition grand coalition 3 singletons 3 singletons 
75% increase 
 
2-player coalition grand coalition 3 singletons 3 singletons 
500% increase 2-player coalition 2-player coalition grand coalition → 3 
singletons 
3 singletons 
Note: An arrow (→) indicates that as Z increases we are moving towards another so-
lution. 
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16 We focus our discussion mainly on an increase in the carrying capacity since we are aware of 
having chosen K lower than suggested by regressions. 
A decrease in the carrying capacity does not change the result. What does 
change our result is an increase in the carrying capacity. For low values of Z, 
the grand coalition is no longer stable since the sum of free riding yields a 
higher payoff and therefore benefits from the grand coalition cannot be distrib-
uted such that it satisfies all fishermen. The higher the carrying capacity be-
comes the broader becomes the area of Z where free riding gives the most bene-
ficial outcomes. All fishermen free riding is, however, not an option; therefore 
the sum of benefits of three singletons and a two-player coalition playing Nash 
against a singleton is compared. Even with changes in the carrying capacity, the 
model illustrates a somewhat self-enforcing behaviour for low values of control 
effort. For large increases in the carrying capacity the grand coalition among 
fishermen is now also possible for higher levels of control effort, this is, how-
ever, not a socially optimal solution since authorities would prefer zero control 
effort if fishermen form a grand coalition. The general conclusion is that for 
low to mid values of Z, a two-player coalition or a grand coalition is preferred 
among fishermen, while for high values of Z, the non-cooperative behaviour 
with three singletons playing Nash against each other is preferred. The sensitiv-
ity analysis suggests that if the stock is low, which it is now, then it is likely 
that the POs will collapse, since the area with 3 singletons dominates. 
 
Since we know from the comparative statics that there is an unambiguous nega-
tive relationship between control effort and control costs, we can conclude that 
inexpensive control effort leads to less cooperation, while an expensive control 
effort leads to more cooperation. When control costs are high and consequently 
control effort low, the fishermen have no choice but to organise adequate con-
trol themselves by joining together. In the opposite case the control effort of the 
authority ensures enough profits for the fishermen in the non-cooperative case. 
Hence, in our numerical example the authority can, by its desired level of con-
trol, affect the optimal coalition structure of the fishermen. 
 
The coalition formation of the authorities indicates that the level of control ef-
fort is, on average, lower if the authorities are decentralised than if they are cen-
tralised. 
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Projecting our simulation model to the Baltic Sea cod fishery, where enforce-
ment is set at the national level, the probability of being caught is not very high, 
at least not in countries belonging to the EU (Holden 1994). This supports the 
conclusion that enforcement set at a decentralised level implies a low level of 
control. The simulation model then indicates that fishermen should join to-
gether and form coalitions. This happens to some extent since the fishermen in 
some countries join together in POs, but it is not as common as our model sug-
gests, and there is no grand coalition. There might be several explanations for 
this. One is that the fishermen might not be aware of the benefits, another might 
be, that our model is only a stylised model, where the resource is exploited by 
three fishermen, in reality more fishermen are represented in the fishery, and 
even though they apply the same technology, they might not join together as a 
group, perhaps because of cultural and language barriers. If the number of fish-
ermen increases, it most likely becomes more difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve a grand coalition solution. Olson (1965) discusses this as a general 
problem to collective goods, and Hannesson (1997) discusses it as a problem in 
fishery models, where he defines the critical number of fishermen for a full co-
operative solution. However, there is some cooperation among POs (at least in 
Denmark) and they plan to assist the Eastern European fishermen to organize 
POs when the EU is enlarged towards the east. This can be regarded as a step 
towards a coalition. 
 
Another point of interest is to determine which solution the authorities prefer. 
We are not able to solve this problem analytically, however we are able to give 
an indication of the preferred solution by applying our numerical example. We 
cannot determine the case of a partly centralised authority, but we determine the 
sum of the benefits for the authorities and we compare these to determine which 
of the scenarios yields the highest sum of benefits.17 The benefits from the three 
scenarios where the authorities are completely centralised are plotted in figure 
5. 
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17 It should be noted, that this simulation only yields an indication of which solution is preferred 
by the authorities. We are not determining the stability of the solutions and we are not deter-
mining the benefits from the two-player coalition among authorities. 
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Figure 5. Total benefits for authorities in the three scenarios where the au-
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In the Baltic Sea the authorities do not cooperate on enforcement, which, ac-
cording to our simulation model is not the solution with the highest benefits. 
We have, however, not determined the stability of having centralised authorities 
and are therefore not able to comment on the actual behaviour of authorities in 
the Baltic Sea. 
7. Discussion, limitations and Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature by setting up a model to discuss coalition 
formation both on the intergovernmental level and on the fishermen level. The 
paper shows that the control policy set by regional, national or multinational 
authorities influences the cooperative behaviour of the fishermen. We show that 
centralised authorities tend to set a level of enforcement that is higher than the 
level set by the decentralised authorities, and the gap between the effort levels 
increases as the unit costs of control increase. The main reason for this conclu-
sion is that the control effort becomes an externality when authorities play a 
Nash game against each other, and the more expensive the control becomes, the 
less control effort the single authority is going to apply. Therefore, if society 
wants a high level of control effort, this is easier to reach if the control effort is 
decided on a multinational level. The conclusion underlines the fact that the 
probability of an offence being detected in the EU, where enforcement is decen-
tralised, is very low (Holden 1994). The paper also shows that the grand coali-
tion among fishermen is stable and socially optimal if and only if the authorities 
set a zero control effort; this is true no matter whether the authorities are cen-
tralised or decentralised. The intuition is, that without any control effort, the 
grand coalition among fishermen faces the same objective function as the soci-
ety, and the solution becomes socially optimal. 
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The paper sets up a simulation model applying parameter values inspired by the 
Baltic Sea cod fishery. The simulation model shows that for low values of con-
trol effort the fishermen will organise adequate control themselves by joining 
together. For high values of control effort fishermen will act as singletons. The 
intuition is that the gain from cooperation is much larger if there is no control. 
There is, however, a great uncertainty about the level of the carrying capacity. 
Therefore the paper includes a sensitivity analysis, to analyse the effects of 
changes in the carrying capacity. This analysis shows that the overall results do 
not change significantly. It is worth noting that the simulation model shows that 
without any control effort, the fishermen are not powerless, but may well organ-
ize a control of their own via formation of a grand coalition or a two-player coa-
lition. For high values of control effort the fishermen let the government do the 
controlling and they play a non-cooperative Nash game against each other. 
What does change when the carrying capacity increases is that it becomes more 
attractive to form coalitions, also for mid-high values of the level of control ef-
fort. For example a 500% increase in the carrying capacity implies that for mid-
high values of the level of control effort the grand coalition is stable for the 
fishermen. It is, however, not a socially optimal solution since we showed that 
only zero control effort would be socially optimal if fishermen form a grand 
coalition. The reason that it becomes more optimal for fishermen to join to-
gether when the carrying capacity increases is that externalities in the fishery 
become more significant, which implies that the benefits from coalitions in-
crease. 
 
The model could not determine the stability of the coalitions among authorities 
or take into what happens if the countries are no longer symmetric. However, it 
is not possible to analyse these scenarios with the set up we have chosen for the 
model. 
 
The model suggests a socially optimal solution, where authorities may or may 
not form coalitions, but where no control effort should be applied and fisher-
men should form coalitions. We suggest an alternative way of thinking, namely, 
how to reach a cooperative solution among fishermen. One (perhaps naïve) way 
to reach such a solution might be for government to drop the existing system 
with TACs, quotas and enforcement and instead encourage cooperation among 
fishermen. The cooperation can be encouraged for instance by subsidising or 
informing about ownership across boarders or by encouraging existing POs to 
help organize POs in the eastern European countries when the EU is enlarged 
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towards the east. A cooperative solution, where fishermen are somehow self-
enforcing, is seen in real-world fisheries in England and Netherlands where 
TACs are distributed only to POs. 
 
The model could further be developed to take into account what happens if the 
numbers of fishermen or authorities are increased. This is an important issue 
since, if the group becomes too large, it often implies that it becomes more dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to achieve a cooperative solution. Cooperation in the 
form of PO’s can, however, help to keep the number of fishermen down. The 
number of fishermen can be increased either because fishermen are not homo-
geneous enough to form a PO or by potential entrants. In our model we have 
implicitly assumed that there are no potential entrants, perhaps due to some 
kind of entry deterrence. The Baltic Sea is a reasonably remote and closed area 
with no international waters, which could explain the entry deterrence on the 
authority level. In years with an exceptionally large biomass, the number of 
fishermen is increased, but these fishermen come from countries already repre-
sented in the sea and we therefore assume they are members of POs already 
represented in the area. The effect on the stability of coalitions with potential 
entrants is ambiguous (Lindroos 2002). 
 
Other assumptions include; the growth of the resource stock follows a logistic 
growth function and the harvest function is a Gordon-Schaefer type. These 
functions are simple functions, but their main contribution to the model is to 
describe a relationship between the fish stock and the harvest. Changing these 
functions might change the quantitative results, but it is our belief that the quali-
tative results are intuitively clear and reasonably general. The model assumes 
that the stock is in steady state. This is not true in most real world setting, but 
we might be on a path to steady state, where over- and undershooting of capac-
ity occurs, but since our model is a one shot game, we have assumed that the 
steady state approximately reflects the real world situation. That our game is a 
one shot game is an area for further research. Coalitions on the national and 
fishermen level modelled in a dynamic game setting would be interesting since 
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other studies show that memory and/or threat strategies can strengthen the sta-
bility of a grand coalition (see e.g. Hannesson 1997). 
 
Assuming identical authorities might not really relate to the Baltic Sea cod fish-
ery, where one player (the EU) is dominant in its size and therefore may act as a 
Stackelberg leader, also towards other authorities. This situation is not illus-
trated in our model and might also be an area for further research. We do, how-
ever, argue that the symmetry among authorities in the sense of fishermen be-
longing to the countries is not critical to our model. Finally, it should be men-
tioned that assuming constant marginal costs is also a limitation of our model. 
This assumption implies that some technologies are not represented when fish-
ermen form coalitions, and one might argue that redistribution among players 
joining the coalition would be more appropriate. This requires a redefinition of 
costs of harvesting, which will complicate the analysis. 
 
The simulation model shows that with the low level of enforcement control in 
the Baltic Sea, the fishermen should organize adequate control themselves, by 
joining together. This happens to some extent, in the form of POs and coopera-
tion between these. The real-world situation therefore already includes some 
cooperation. Our model suggests that further cooperation would be beneficial 
and should be encouraged. The reason that our model does not precisely depict 
the real world setting might be sought in the fact that the fishermen are too het-
erogeneous to form only 3 groups of fishermen. 
 
We are aware that our model describes the possible effects of cooperation on 
both the intergovernmental level and the fishermen level in a simplistic fashion. 
The assumptions and the limitations of the model should be kept in mind when 
projecting the model to real world settings. 
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9. Appendix 
Table A.I. The optimal fishing effort when the authorities are centralised 
Coalition among fishermen Optimal fishing effort 
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Table A.II. The optimal control effort when the authorities are centralised 
Coalition among fishermen Optimal control effort 
3 singletons 
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1111 ++= . Only a corner solution, where , satisfies 0 ≤ Z < 1. 
This is seen from the fact that the second term on the RHS either becomes 
greater than or equal to one or is negative. This depends on the denominator. If 
0=GCCAZ
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rc2 > 2KPqi2γ, the optimal level of control effort becomes negative, or if rc2 < 
2KPqi2γ, the control effort asymptotically approaches 1 from above. 
 
Table A.III. The optimal fishing effort when the authorities are decentralised 
Coalition among fishermen Optimal fishing effort  
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Table A.IV. The optimal control effort when the authorities are decentralised 
Coalition among fishermen Optimal control effort 
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